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Abstract 
Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do 
so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that 
achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And sup-
pose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, 
without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. 
Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by 
incurring—from this point forward—no more cost than it warranted at the 
outset. If you now succeed, the total cost will exceed the upper bound 
marked at the beginning. But the additional cost from this point is below 
that upper bound. And the good you will achieve is undiminished. How do 
the moral costs you have already inflicted bear upon your decision now?  
 
1. Introduction 
Sometimes the world cooperates with our plans. We can achieve our goals, 
or vindicate our rights and others', without incurring any moral costs along 
the way. Justice and the good come for free, with no need to inflict or en-
dure harms or injustices in their pursuit.  
More commonly, however, the world is not so compliant. We have to 
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fight for the good, fight for our rights. And casualties are inevitable. We 
bear costs ourselves, and we inflict them upon others. Pursuing our ends 
can be right only if they are worth those costs. So how do we determine 
whether our moral goals are worth the moral costs?  
Recent work in the ethics of war has revealed a new puzzle within this 
most basic of moral questions.2 Suppose that, at the outset, you believed 
that achieving your goal was worth incurring a given amount of moral cost; 
if you knew you would incur more, it would be wrong to proceed. And sup-
pose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, 
without advancing your cause at all. You can now reflect again on whether 
to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can 
achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no more cost than it 
warranted at the outset. If you now succeed, the total cost will exceed the 
upper bound marked at the beginning. But the additional cost from this 
point is lower than that upper bound. And the good you will achieve is un-
diminished. How do the moral costs you have already inflicted bear upon 
your decision now? Should you treat them as economists think we should 
treat 'sunk costs', and disregard them?3 Or should they somehow affect 
what you are permitted to do now? 
This kind of case readily arises in the use of force. In the terms of just 
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war theory, our topic is proportionality. A war of defence against aggres-
sion, for example, might be proportionate at T1, provided its goals can be 
achieved without inflicting more than X civilian casualties. At T2, we might 
find ourselves with X civilian casualties already, but without having re-
versed the initial aggression. We must then ask whether it is proportionate 
to continue fighting, given that we will exceed our initial 'proportionality 
budget'.4 This quandary can also arise for particular actions within war, as 
well as in uses of force outside war. Suppose, for example, that an initial 
armed attempt to free some hostages has failed, and the number of inno-
cent casualties already exceeds what would, at the outset, have been pro-
portionate to ending the crisis. How should those 'moral sunk costs' affect 
what we ought to do now?  
Questions of proportionality also arise in other contexts: for example, 
in risky rescue attempts, emergency medicine or the management of bush-
fires. And the problem arises in more mundane scenarios too—environ-
mental regulation and public health policy, for example; even taxation. In 
all these areas, you want to achieve some moral goal, doing so is 'worth' a 
particular degree of moral cost and no more; at some point during the pro-
cess, you reassess and realise that you can no longer achieve the objective 
and remain within your antecedent 'proportionality budget', but if you look 
only forward, the remaining costs do seem justified by the remaining good. 
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The nascent discussion of moral sunk costs has settled into two camps. 
Adopting Jeff McMahan's terminology, we have on one side the 'Quota 
View', and on the other the 'Prospective View'. Adherents of the Quota 
View think the initial proportionality budget is absolutely constraining.5 
'Prospectivists' think that at each decision point we should look only for-
ward: sunk costs are irrelevant, except insofar as they constitute evidence 
against our more optimistic projections about how things will go from now 
on.6  
I think that neither side has captured the whole truth: I propose an in-
termediate approach, which I call the Discount View. Of course, a mere 
compound of two positions might deliver the right verdicts on cases, but 
still be explanatorily inadequate. I show that the Discount View is 
grounded in a sensible underlying moral theory, and offer some arguments 
in its favour. I then consider some implications and objections, before con-
cluding. 
2. Framing the Problem 
Moral sunk costs raise many interesting conceptual and normative issues. 
My focus in this article is comparatively narrow. I want to ask whether and 
how moral sunk costs can render an act disproportionate. There are many 
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different interpretations of the proportionality condition, and I cannot con-
sider them all.7 So, for my purposes, an act is disproportionate if and only 
if its expected moral costs outweigh its expected moral benefits.  
An act's moral costs are all the negative considerations that it brings 
about, as determined (and weighted) by one's broader moral theory. That 
theory might give more weight to costs of which the act is a more proximate 
cause, or to costs that are intended rather than merely foreseen, and so on. 
Benefits are the positive analogue of costs, and are subject to similar 
weightings. By the 'expected costs' of an act I mean the probability-
weighted average of the costs in the possible outcomes of that act. To de-
termine the expected costs for an act f, multiply the cost of each possible 
outcome of f-ing by that outcome's probability of coming about; the sum 
of those products is the expected cost. Work out the expected benefits in a 
parallel way. Determining which probabilities count is itself a deeply vexed 
question. To fix matters, I stipulate that the relevant probabilities are 
grounded in the evidence available if one does the morally appropriate re-
search.  
Mine, then, is an 'evidence-relative' understanding of proportionality. 
We could also understand proportionality as 'fact-relative' or 'belief-rela-
tive', among other possibilities.8 Most philosophers understand 
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proportionality as necessary but not sufficient for permissibility. But we 
can understand permissibility in these different ways as well, so each inter-
pretation of proportionality must be linked to an interpretation of permis-
sibility. The most plausible approach keeps both standards in the same ep-
istemic register: an act's being evidence-relative proportionate is a neces-
sary condition of its being evidence-relative permissible; an act's being fact-
relative proportionate is a necessary condition of its being fact-relative per-
missible, and so on. Mixed alternatives are possible, but I will not consider 
them further. The ensuing discussion will focus on evidence-relative pro-
portionality, and evidence-relative permissibility. 
With these stipulations in place, we can frame the central question of 
the paper more precisely. Suppose you want to pursue a morally worthy 
goal, G. Your alternatives at T1 are to f or to do nothing. f-ing has some 
prospect of realising G. Its expected benefits are B, its expected costs C. C 
is equal to B, so at T1 f-ing in pursuit of G is just proportionate. 
So, you f, but things don't go according to plan. By T2 you have achieved 
nothing of value, but you have already inflicted an actual cost equal to C. 
But now you face a choice whether to y or to do nothing, where y-ing has 
some prospect of realising G. The expected costs of y-ing are C, and the 
expected benefits are B—just the same as for f-ing. Should the costs in-
curred when you f-d have any bearing on whether it is proportionate for 
you to y?  
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There are three possible responses. First: costs incurred at T1 increase 
the urgency of realising G at T2, and hence the benefit of doing so. One 
might think, for example, that we have additional reason at T2 to redeem 
the sacrifices made following the decision at T1.9 Although this clearly 
chimes with some common intuitions, I want to focus instead on whether 
moral sunk costs incurred by f-ing can count against the proportionality of 
y-ing.  
The Prospective View says that they cannot. The costs incurred by f-
ing are in the past; you can do nothing about them, so they are irrelevant to 
whether y-ing is proportionate. If f-ing was proportionate, given C and B, 
then so is y-ing, since C and B here are projected to be the same as before.  
By contrast, on the Quota View, the pursuit of G gives us a fixed propor-
tionality budget. Once that budget is exhausted, it is disproportionate to 
incur any further moral costs to that end. The costs incurred when you f-d 
at T1 used up your proportionality budget for the pursuit of G, so it is dis-
proportionate to y at T2.  
The Discount View combines the best features of the Quota and Pro-
spective Views. But before introducing it, it will help to offer an example to 
illustrate the difference between those alternatives and highlight the need 
for a new approach. 
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3. Shortcomings of the Quota and Prospective Views 
The problem of moral sunk costs pervades many of our weightiest and 
most morally serious endeavours. It is a complex problem: to clearly iden-
tify the difference between the competing views, we need a very simple 
case, without the complicating distractions involved in any more realistic 
scenario.  
Iterated Loop: A trolley is heading towards five innocent vic-
tims, who can be saved only if you divert it. It is approaching 
a junction, controlled by a probabilistic lever. If you pull the 
lever, then there is some probability, p, that the trolley will 
head down the track called STOP, where it will kill nobody, 
and come to a halt. But there is some probability, 1-p, that it 
will instead head down the LOOP track, where it will kill one 
person, and then loop round to the start, again heading to-
wards the five. The LOOP victim will immediately be re-
placed, leaving you with the same decision at T2 as you faced 
at T1, with just the same odds; the same holds for T3‒Tn. 
All the potential beneficiaries and victims are there through no fault of 
their own; each has as much to live for as the others. The lever is governed 
by quantum mechanics, so its probabilities are true objective chances, 
known in advance.  
Suppose that at T1 you pull the lever. You are unlucky; the trolley heads 
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down LOOP, killing one innocent person. How, if at all, should the death 
already inflicted in the attempt to save the five affect what you ought to do 
at T2, when the trolley approaches the junction for a second time, and you 
must decide again whether to pull the lever? 
Let's use the ratio familiar from most contemporary discussions of trol-
ley cases, and stipulate that for an expected benefit equivalent to five lives 
saved, any more than one expected death inflicted would be disproportion-
ate. You have already inflicted one death in the attempt to save the five, so 
the expected total cost of pulling the lever at T2 having pulled it at T1 is one 
certain death plus 1-p chance of another death. The Quota View, then, must 
say at T2 that it is disproportionate to pull the lever. 
The Prospective View says that costs inflicted at T1 are irrelevant to 
what you ought to do at T2. The expected costs and benefits that determine 
whether it is proportionate to proceed at T2 are exclusively those that have 
not yet occurred. It follows that your decision at Tn is the same as it is at T1. 
If it was proportionate to pull the lever at T1, then it must be proportionate 
to do so at Tn. Even if the trolley were to keep looping ad infinitum, if you 
should pull the lever at T1, then you should do so every time subsequently.  
 
Framed in this way, it is easy to see why neither of these views is wholly 
satisfactory. The Quota View gives us a strict proportionality budget to use 
in the pursuit of any given good. Once that budget is used up, no further 
risks may be run, no matter how much is at stake. Jeff McMahan has argued 
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that it would be absurd to turn down the opportunity to certainly achieve 
your goal at T2, just because doing so would involve some comparatively 
negligible moral cost.10  
Consider a variant on the above case—call it Iterated Loop (Finger). Sup-
pose that p(STOP) = 0.5. At T1 you pulled the lever, but were unlucky: the 
trolley went down LOOP, killing one person. Now at T2, the trolley is com-
ing around for the second time. But this time, the person on LOOP is at risk 
of a much lesser harm—losing a finger, say. Had you known that all this 
would happen from the start, then it would have been disproportionate to 
pull the lever at T1—the expected costs would have included one death for 
sure, and 0.5 probability of a finger, which by hypothesis exceeds what can 
be justified by the prospect of saving the five. So the Quota View has to say 
that you must stop. You cannot pull the lever again. Your reasons to save 
the five cannot justify any further costs on their behalf.  
In this case, the Prospective View gives the intuitively plausible verdict, 
because it disregards moral sunk costs. But Moellendorf has argued that 
the Quota View can get this case right.11 In cases like these, he suggests, we 
should reassess our initial proportionality calculation, and argue that the 
benefit of realising the goal is in fact worth one death and a 0.5 probability 
                                                        
10 McMahan (2015: 702). Victor Tadros has also been a prominent proponent of this objec-
tion, in forthcoming work.  
11 Moellendorf (2015: 668). 
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of cutting off a finger. We might bolster his view by arguing that the relata 
in the proportionality calculation are inherently vague, so the boundary 
between what counts as proportionate and disproportionate is fuzzy 
enough to subsume small additional expected costs.12  
Although these responses soften the implications of McMahan's objec-
tion for the Quota View, they do not offer a decisive solution. Suppose that 
we revise the proportionality budget, as Moellendorf suggests, allowing 
you to pull the lever at T2, in Finger. But you are again unlucky, causing the 
person on LOOP to lose his finger. The trolley returns to the beginning, and 
another victim is placed on LOOP, her finger at stake: the total expected 
cost of pulling the lever at T3 is now a life and one finger, plus 0.5 probabil-
ity of another finger being lost. If we again revisit the initial proportionality 
calculation, arguing that saving the five is worth that much expected cost, 
then we can simply ratchet things up again. We can keep doing this until it 
is simply implausible to assert that the counterintuitive implication can be 
explained away by appealing either to an initially incorrect proportionality 
calculation or to the vagueness of the comparisands. It will always be coun-
terintuitive to refuse the opportunity to save five lives at the cost of a finger, 
no matter how many fingers have already been lost.  
Consider, for example, Iterated Loop (0.999), in which p(STOP) = 0.999. 
Suppose that you pull the lever at T1, and the trolley goes down LOOP, 
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killing an innocent victim. At T2, according to the Quota View, pulling the 
lever has an expected total cost of 1.001 expected deaths—the one death 
inflicted at T1, and 0.001 expected deaths from pulling the lever at T2. Sup-
pose, as Moellendorf argues, that this is close enough to one expected death 
that pulling the lever still counts as proportionate. Again you are unlucky, 
and are faced with the same decision. If you pull the lever at T3, then the 
expected cost is 2.001 expected deaths—the deaths inflicted at T1 and T2, 
and a further 0.001 prospect of taking the third victim's life on LOOP. That 
amount of expected cost would clearly be disproportionate even to a cer-
tainty of saving the five. So it is impermissible to pull the lever at T3. Indeed, 
it would be impermissible even if the probability of the trolley going down 
STOP, killing nobody, was arbitrarily close to 1. This is an unavoidable im-
plication of the Quota View, and is deeply counterintuitive. 
 
The Prospective View fares much better in these cases. Because it disre-
gards moral sunk costs, if the expected benefits are worth the expected 
costs from this point forward, then it is proportionate to proceed, regardless 
of costs already incurred.  But this leads to its own problems. As Rodin, Fa-
bre and Moellendorf have all argued, there is in principle no stopping point 
to the ratcheting up of moral costs incurred in the pursuit of some finitely 
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valuable objective.13 While it seems plausible that we should always be able 
to run a small risk for the sake of a great benefit, no matter how much cost 
has already been incurred, the Prospective View is much more extreme 
than this.  
Return to Iterated Loop. Suppose that p(STOP) = 0.5. And suppose that 
there is an infinite supply of victims who can be placed on LOOP (imagine 
the case to be a supertask, in which an infinite series of actions can be per-
formed in a finite time). Call this variant Infinite Loop. Assuming the stand-
ard 1:5 moral mathematics, the Prospective View should say that it is pro-
portionate to proceed at T1, and indeed at every iteration of the problem, ad 
infinitum: the expected cost of pulling the lever at every iteration is one ex-
pected death caused, the expected benefit is five lives saved. More gener-
ally, if it is proportionate to proceed at T1, then it is proportionate to pro-
ceed at Tn for any n. So the Prospective View implies that it can be propor-
tionate to countenance inflicting infinite costs for the sake of realising a fi-
nite good, with constant stakes throughout. This seems like no less a theo-
retical cost than that faced by the Quota View.  
It is important not to overstate this point. Moellendorf's claim that no 
finite good is worth infinite costs is true, but not apposite.14 Our question is 
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whether the expected good is worth the expected cost. And the Prospective 
View does not imply that a finite expected good can outweigh infinite ex-
pected cost. Even though in the infinite variant of Iterated Loop it is possible 
for the same decision problem to be repeated an infinite number of times, 
the probabilities decrease as the possible costs increase, so the expected 
cost remains finite.15 But still, how can it be proportionate to even entertain 
incurring infinite costs for the sake of a finite good, continuing at every it-
eration to run the same risk of things going wrong? One can't help but feel 
the pull of Rodin's, Fabre's and Moellendorf's worry that, on the Prospec-
tive View, the proportionality constraint has too little bite.  
4. The Discount View 
Each side of this debate has made a strong case against the other. The 
Quota View avoids being excessively permissive at the cost of being exces-
sively strict. The Prospective View makes the reverse trade-off. Each view 
is consonant with only half of the 'intuitive data'. The obvious solution is to 
find a middle way between them.  
To improve on the Prospective and Quota views, our principle must 
permit incurring small risks for the sake of significant expected benefits, 
but prohibit indefinitely and repeatedly running the same magnitude of 
risk for the sake of a constant probability of achieving the same goal.. The 
                                                        
15 See Lazar (2016).   
 15 
solution: as you rack up costs in the failed attempt to pursue a morally wor-
thy objective, your reasons to secure that objective progressively diminish 
in weight (are discounted), until they reach a lower bound beneath which 
they cannot drop. In other words, you always have some reason to realise 
your objective. But your reasons diminish in weight as you incur more costs 
for that objective's sake, asymptotically approaching a lower limit. 
A principle like this would let us have our cake and eat it too. We could 
adopt the permissiveness of the Prospective View in cases like Finger and 
0.999: no matter how many times the lever has been pulled, the expected 
benefit of saving the five is always worth enough to justify an additional 
risk of someone losing their finger, or a 0.001 risk of killing an innocent 
person—and could arguably justify more than that. But we can channel the 
Quota View in other cases: the expected benefit of pulling the lever at T2 is 
less than that at T1, and in general is less at Tn+1 than at Tn, so at some point 
in cases like Infinite Loop, where the risks are held constant, it must become 
disproportionate to proceed. This means we need not countenance end-
lessly imposing the same magnitude of risk for the sake of a constant prob-
ability of achieving the same goal.  
 
Neither the Quota nor the Prospective View has been given firm theoretical 
foundations. Both rest, thus far, only on intuitions about cases. On that 
score, the Discount View is already in good shape. Some cases favour the 
idea that past costs can render it impermissible to keep imposing 
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significant risks for the sake of the same benefit; some cases favour ignoring 
past costs in deliberations about proportionality. We can accommodate all 
of those intuitions in a view that our reasons to act in iterated decision 
problems can diminish in force asymptotically to some lower bound, so 
that they always justify imposing some additional risk of harm, but cannot, 
at Tn, justify imposing as much risk as they would justify at T1.  
However, I do not want to rely only on intuitions about cases to defend 
the Discount View. I want to make a theoretical case for it—while acknowl-
edging that, given the diversity of views on the underlying moral theory, it 
is good to remain as ecumenical as possible. 
To motivate the Discount View, I need only the idea that, when others' 
well-being is at stake, our reasons to help them are grounded in one of at 
least two facts. First, their well-being is intrinsically valuable. This grounds 
reasons to promote their well-being. Second, they are intrinsically valuable: 
they have moral status, and matter independently of how their well-being 
contributes to the world. This grounds reasons to show them appropriate 
respect.  
I will write that we have well-being-based reasons, grounded in the intrin-
sic value of well-being, and status-based reasons grounded in equal moral 
status. This may be somewhat factitious, since one could say that all of our 
moral reasons are grounded in both sources. I will return to that possibility 
in Section 5. For now, it helps keep things clear to consider them as two 
kinds of reasons.  
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Our status-based reasons are grounded in the importance of equal re-
spect for those of equal moral status, and are most notably associated with 
our rights, both to be helped, and not to be harmed. Typically, failure to act 
on a status-based reason towards another person amounts to a failure of 
respect, and, at least pro tanto, wrongs the victim. Of course, status-based 
reasons need not be verdictive: sometimes we are all-things-considered jus-
tified in committing an act that pro tanto wrongs a person.  
Our well-being-based reasons are reasons to avert suffering and bring 
about happiness, just because suffering is bad and happiness is good. Fail-
ure to act on a well-being-based reason might be wrong, but does not 
wrong anyone in particular, nor does it involve a failure of respect.  
Some old-fashioned utilitarians might believe that well-being-based 
reasons exhaust the moral domain. In other words, we only have reasons to 
promote well-being.16 Some hard-line deontologists will think that we only 
have status-based reasons, and have no reason to promote well-being as 
such. The Discount View is most interesting if these extreme views are 
false, but if you're an old-fashioned utilitarian, then I think my arguments 
show that you should endorse the Prospective View, while if you're a hard-
line deontologist you can still endorse the Discount View (see Section 5).  
It is worth pausing to consider one objection that might come from de-
ontologists at this point. They might agree on the distinction between 
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the distinction between status-based and well-being-based reasons, see Chappell (2015).  
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status-based reasons and well-being-based reasons, but deny that it is rele-
vant to trolley cases, arguing that that we have only well-being-based rea-
sons to turn the trolley; and we have only status-based reasons not to do 
so.17 I have more and less concessive responses.  
The first response is concessive. Even if this interpretation of trolley 
cases is true, the Discount View might still be right. Perhaps it does not ap-
ply in trolley cases, but does apply to others where status-based reasons are 
active. Or perhaps our well-being-based reasons, properly understood, do 
in fact diminish in the way needed to support the Discount View (more on 
this in Section 5). 
A less concessive—and I think correct—response: status-based reasons 
are in play in standard trolley cases; they can tell both for saving the five, 
and against killing the one. Two arguments:  
First, suppose that the five were culpably responsible for the one being 
on the loop track, in Infinite Loop. In that case, there would be no status-
based reason to save them. They would be liable to bear their deaths, to 
ensure that their victim is not killed, so would not be wronged by being left 
to die. Still, you would have some well-being-based reason to help them. If 
you could save them by turning the trolley towards the one, knowing that 
he would suffer only an injured foot, then it might be permissible to do so. 
But this is quite different from the proportionality ratio in standard trolley 
                                                        
17 Thanks to a referee for pushing me on this point.  
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cases. When the five lack rights to life, the proportionality ratio radically 
changes. This suggests that in ordinary trolley cases (without culpability), 
the five have rights to life. Since reasons to protect and preserve people's 
rights are status-based reasons, this implies that in standard trolley cases, 
you have status-based reasons to save the five.  
The second argument shows that there clearly are status-based reasons 
in some non-standard trolley cases, which implies that they are also pre-
sent in standard cases. Suppose you can save the five by turning the trolley 
down an empty side-track, harming nobody, at negligible personal cost. If 
you let the five die, you seriously wrong them. This would be not only a 
gratuitous failure to realise some good, but a failure of respect.  
Now suppose that there is someone on the side-track, who will die if the 
trolley is turned. If the trolley is not turned, however, 1,000 people will die 
(raise the number if you like). 18  Now you seem clearly required to turn the 
trolley. Not turning it would wrong the 1,000. This implies that you have 
status-based reasons to aid the 1,000.19 It does not entail, of course, that you 
have only status-based reasons to aid the 1,000. 
If we have status-based reasons to aid the five in the no-cost case, and 
                                                        
18 Helen Frowe argues that even in 5:1 cases you are morally required to turn the trolley, 
her account of our duties of rescue, in my terminology, amounts to arguing that you have 
status-based reasons to turn the trolley in such cases. Frowe (2018).  
19 I say 'implies', because it is possible that the 1,000 might be wronged, without status-
based reasons being engaged, in which case this argument would not go through. How-
ever, I think that someone having a justified complaint is pretty good evidence that a sta-
tus-based reason has been contravened.  
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status-based reasons to aid the 1,000 in the last case, it is highly likely that 
we have status-based reasons to aid the five in standard trolley cases. The 
most plausible explanation is that in each of these variations your reasons 
to save any given person are the same: the difference between the cases just 
depends on (1) how many other interests are aligned with that individual's 
interest, and (2) the aggregate weight of the competing reasons.20 
One could argue that we can only determine which reasons tell in fa-
vour of saving a person when we hold fixed the reasons that tell against it.21 
If this is right, then we cannot infer that status-based reasons are at work in 
the 5 v 1 case from their being at work in the 5 v 0 and 1,000 v 1 case. How-
ever, I don't think that it is generally true that we can work out which rea-
sons tell for a particular action, only by first considering which reasons tell 
against. It is much more plausible that your reasons to save any particular 
person remain constant across these cases, with the only difference being 
how many other people you can save, and whether someone has to be sac-
rificed.  
 
So, we have reasons to aid others, grounded in both the intrinsic value of 
their well-being, and in their moral status. When assessing whether an ac-
tion is proportionate, we must weigh these reasons together. My proposal: 
                                                        
20 As a referee points out, this means that status-based reasons can sometimes be aggre-
gated. This is consistent, however, with aggregation being barred in some cases—e.g. 
where we weigh saving one life against averting some very large number of headaches. 
21 Thanks to a referee for this point.  
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our status-based reasons weaken as we incur more moral costs in the failed 
attempt to achieve our goals. Our well-being-based reasons, however, re-
tain their full force.  
This proposal raises many questions. First: why should we think that 
our status-based reasons and our well-being-based reasons differ in this 
way?  
Our well-being-based reasons are grounded in the intrinsic value of 
others' well-being. The intrinsic quality of that well-being is unaffected by 
the moral sunk costs incurred in the failed attempts to realise it. Of course, 
contingently, the beneficiaries' lives might be less happy, tainted by regret 
for the costs incurred in the effort to save them. But we can stipulate this 
away by saying that everyone has just as much to live for as everyone else. 
Whether you save the five at T1 or T10, the welfare value that you realise by 
doing so is the same. So, reasons grounded in the intrinsic value of well-
being will persist undiminished. What's more, since saving five lives is al-
ways a good thing to do, we will always have sufficient reason in variations 
on Iterated Loop to justify running small risks of serious harms, or high risks 
of less serious harms.  
This point guarantees that our reasons to save the five will always re-
main above some lower bound. This definitively separates the Discount 
View from the Quota View, which asserts that at some point no further 
risks can be justified. It also lends support to the Prospective View for those 
who think that we have only well-being-based reasons to help the five in 
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trolley cases. To part ways with the Prospective View, I now need to show 
that our status-based reasons do diminish in force from one iteration to the 
next. I have a number of arguments to that effect.  
First, though, note that I want only to show that the weight of our status-
based reasons to achieve a goal G can be diminished by the costs inflicted 
in failed attempts to realise G. I take no stand on whether our status-based 
reasons can be wholly exhausted (I think they cannot), nor on precisely 
what the discount rate should be (I think it is unlikely to be very steep). I 
want only to show that there is some such discount rate. I have two kinds 
of arguments: the first appeals to specific features of status-based reasons; 
the second presents variations on Iterated Loop that favour the Discount 
View.  
I have four arguments in the first category. The first is the most general. 
If you have a status-based reason to help me, then, in general, at least pro 
tanto, you owe it to me to help me, and if you fail to do so, you wrong me 
(pro tanto). Suppose that, in Iterated Loop, the probability of the trolley going 
down LOOP is 0.01. Failing to pull the lever at T1 would, I think, wrong the 
five. But suppose that you pull the lever at T1 and T2, and twice you get un-
lucky, killing two innocent people. Is it at all plausible that, at T3, failure to 
pull the lever would wrong the five in just the same way as failure to do so 
at T1 would have? Is it plausible that you owe it to the five to pull the lever 
at T3, that failing to pull it would show them disrespect? I think not. You 
have already shown your respect for the five by pulling the lever twice, 
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taking a serious moral risk on their behalf, and causing two innocent 
deaths. It is much less plausible that you owe it to them to pull the lever at 
T3, having already incurred those costs. Of course, it might still be the right 
thing to do, because of the great good you can achieve by pulling the lever, 
but that would have to do with your well-being-based reasons to save the 
five, more than your status-based reasons. 
The second argument draws on ideas of fairness. Your reasons to save 
the five in Iterated Loop may be partly grounded in the importance of giving 
them a fair chance of survival. 22 Suppose that p(LOOP) is 0.5. You pull the 
lever at T1, and the trolley goes down LOOP, killing one. You face the same 
decision at T2. But the argument that you now owe the five a fair chance of 
survival carries less weight. Even though it did not turn out well, they have 
at least had some chance of survival. Indeed, at some point the person on 
LOOP might be able to argue that you have already given the five a greater 
chance of survival than you would give him by pulling the lever, so he has 
a claim, grounded in fairness, that you not pull the lever again.23 
Could one reply that, since you now know that the trolley went down 
LOOP, you did not give the five any chance of survival at T1?24 Since I stip-
ulated that the lever was governed by objective chance, this response is 
                                                        
22 See Rasmussen (2012); Taurek (1977); Walden (2014). Thanks here to Christian Barry. 
23 Thanks to Christian Barry for this point. 
24 See e.g. Wasserman (1996). Thanks to Victor Tadros for raising this objection. 
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somewhat illicit. Nonetheless, in realistic cases the probabilities are likely 
to be only epistemic, and in some of these a failed attempt will reveal that 
the epistemic probability was misleading. And yet, even if the flip of a coin 
(say) is fully determined, it is still an intuitively fair way to resolve a dispute 
between parties with an equal claim. We have a claim that others treat us 
fairly. And how they treat us depends on what their evidence is. So giving 
someone a fair chance simply means giving them a reasonable prospect on 
your evidence. So, at T2 you have already given the five a fair chance of sur-
vival, so this should diminish their claim to aid.  
The third argument draws on the closely-related consideration of reci-
procity. The Prospective View says that we can rack up sacrifices for the 
sake of the intended beneficiaries indefinitely, far past their actual capacity 
to ever reciprocate. Now, of course some of our rights are independent of 
our ability either to reciprocate or to 'pay it forward', but still, our ability to 
reciprocate sacrifices made on our behalf surely gives them some addi-
tional weight.  
Return to Iterated Loop. Suppose you have pulled the lever five times, 
killing five victims on LOOP. Now the trolley approaches the junction for 
the sixth time. If you pull the lever and it again takes LOOP, then the five 
cannot, even in principle, sacrifice for others to the same degree as others 
have already sacrificed for them—they have only five lives to give. Their 
claim that others continue to bear risks for their sake is at least somewhat 
diminished. Our duties of rescue are not grounded in reciprocity alone, and 
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some beneficiaries will forever be in 'moral deficit'. But these duties at least 
have a dimension that rests on the idea that we could all, in principle, be the 
ones to bear those costs for others' sakes. And if we completely disregard 
moral sunk costs, then situations can arise in which the beneficiaries of our 
risky rescue attempts take more from others than they could ever realisti-
cally endure for others' sakes.  
This leads to the fourth argument. We typically think that people whose 
rights are infringed in the all-things-considered permissible attempt to pre-
serve or vindicate another person's rights are entitled to compensation for 
their losses. When Feinberg's backpacker breaks into the hunting lodge, he 
clearly owes its owner compensation for the damage.25 Civilians whose 
property is destroyed as a foreseeable 'collateral' harm in a just war are, in 
principle, entitled to compensation. Again, in principle, the most natural 
people to bear the cost of that compensation are those for whose sake the 
costs were incurred. And if we have no regard to sunk costs at all, then those 
compensatory obligations will mount beyond the point where anybody 
could possibly address them. By continuing to pull the lever, we are sad-
dling the would-be beneficiaries with a debt that they cannot pay.  
Considerations of respect, fairness, reciprocity and compensation all 
suggest that the status-based reasons to aid the intended beneficiaries of 
your action diminish in weight as you try and fail to save them, imposing 
                                                        
25 Feinberg (1978). 
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costs on others along the way. None of these arguments, however, bears on 
the well-being-based reasons that you have to save the five. Whatever else 
is true, saving five innocent happy lives is always a good thing, that you 
have some reason to bring about. The magnitude of the well-being realised 
if you save the five is unaffected by issues of respect, fairness, reciprocity 
and compensation.  
Notice, also, that these arguments do not entail any particular discount 
rate, or any particular view on whether our status-based reasons can be 
fully exhausted. They all simply give some justification for the status-based 
reasons being discounted at one iteration relative to the one before it. 
 
The rest of my case for the Discount View rests on some further variations 
on Iterated Loop.  
Suppose, first, that after you pull the lever at T1 and the trolley goes 
down LOOP, the five victims are changed. You had no knowledge that this 
would happen, and no way of finding out. But now, at T2, you have killed 
one person, and five different people are at risk. What you did to save the 
five at T1 has no bearing on your reasons to save the five at T2. So from the 
perspective of your status-based reasons, your decision at T2 should be 
identical to your decision at T1 (no discount). Meanwhile, the well-being-
based considerations are just the same at T2 as they were at T1—different 
bearers of well-being, to be sure, but the same amount. So, again, the case 
for pulling the lever at T2 is no weaker than it was at T1. Indeed, the fact that 
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you are somewhat responsible for the second group of five being on the 
track might affect what you ought to do at T2—perhaps your status-based 
reasons to help them are stronger than would otherwise be the case. This 
supports the Discount View, which predicts that the sunk costs worry arises 
from a discount in our status-based reasons, which is absent from this case.  
Next, suppose that you are faced with two identical track setups. The 
probabilities are the same, but the second has only just started running, 
while the first has been running for three unsuccessful pulls of the lever. 
You must choose between the two tracks—you cannot pull both levers. I 
think you have stronger reasons to pull the lever on the second track. Three 
people have already lost their lives for the sake of the five on the first track; 
they have already had a fair chance at survival; the five on the second track 
have a clean slate, and have had no chance at survival yet, and so have a 
stronger claim to aid. If you share this intuition, then that also favours the 
Discount View (though it is also consistent with the Quota View; it tells 
against the Prospective View).  
Third, suppose the same person is on the LOOP track for every iteration 
of Iterated Loop, and instead of death being at stake, anyone hit by the trol-
ley will suffer searing but temporary pain that is soon forgotten. After a 
point it is clearly impermissible to switch the trolley—the five must take 
the hit. There is a clear limit to what they can expect one person to bear on 
their behalf. This suggests there should also be a limit to what they can ex-
pect some larger number of people to endure for their sake. Of course, 
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there is a difference between spreading costs out over many people, and 
concentrating them all on one person. Nonetheless, the lesson from this 
case is that aggregate costs matter. This supports the Discount View and 
the Quota View, but looks more troublesome for the Prospective View.  
Finally, suppose that you are one of the five, and you can choose 
whether to pull the lever. If you have a claim to be saved, grounded in sta-
tus-based reasons, then you can permissibly enforce that claim by pulling 
the lever. Suppose you have pulled the lever twice already, and killed two 
people. Could you permissibly pull the lever a third time? Do you have a 
claim, grounded in considerations of equal moral status, to do so?  I think 
not. Of course, this just restates the conclusion that I am trying to argue for, 
but certainly I feel its intuitive pull even more strongly when I imagine be-
ing both the beneficiary and the person inflicting the sunk costs. 
Together with the arguments from respect, fairness, reciprocity and 
compensation, as well as the Discount View's ability to avoid the counter-
intuitive implications of both the Quota View and the Prospective View, 
and its reliance on a plausible picture of our underlying reasons to aid oth-
ers, these additional intuitively plausible results lend the Discount View 
further support. In the next section, I consider some of the view's implica-
tions, and some objections to it. 
5. Implications and Objections  
The first implication of the Discount View is that, in choices potentially 
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involving moral sunk costs, we must attend to the kinds of reasons at stake. 
If the choice is driven by the importance of promoting well-being, then we 
should lean towards disregarding sunk costs. If it is driven by respect and 
status considerations, then we should be more inclined to take sunk costs 
into account. And in this latter case, we must also attend to whether the 
costs were incurred for the sake of the particular people who would benefit 
from continuing one's pursuit of the objective at stake.  
Warfare is the paradigm case in which moral sunk costs matter. The 
prosecution of war always involves violating fundamental rights. So it can 
be proportionate only if done in the pursuit of our most fundamental indi-
vidual and collective rights. If status-based reasons are not at stake, then 
there is no chance the war is proportionate. We don't fight wars to promote 
well-being. What's more, in most conflicts (though perhaps not the most 
protracted), the population in whose defence the war is fought is relatively 
stable. So moral sunk costs must be taken into account, and we must be 
sensitive to the costs already inflicted as we consider whether it is propor-
tionate at T2 to continue a war that was justly begun at T1.  
Few areas of public policy are exclusively aimed at the promotion of 
well-being; ordinarily rights are at stake, one way or the other. But in long-
term policy decisions there may often be population turnover—this is 
likely to be true for environmental policy for example—which would im-
ply that sunk costs can more often be disregarded in that area. 
The second implication: individuals must anticipate moral sunk costs 
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at the outset of a potentially iterated decision problem. I discuss this in de-
tail elsewhere, but here I want to emphasise two points.26 
(a) If there is some probability that you will achieve your goal only at T4, 
say, rather than at T1, then the good that you will realise will be lesser, in 
proportion to the degree of discount that would apply to the claims of the 
beneficiaries given the three failed attempts to save them. This, in turn, 
makes pulling the lever at T1 somewhat harder to justify. It raises the bar 
needed for pulling the lever to be proportionate. The effect will resemble 
David Rodin's 'moral contingency' in the proportionality budget—taking 
the Discount View into consideration will mean that at T1 some options 
which would be proportionate under the Prospective View will be dispro-
portionate.27 
(b) Additionally, if we take 'future sunk costs' into account from the out-
set, as the Discount View says that we must, then we know that, in an iter-
ated decision problem, there may come a time when we should stop. So we 
have to ask ourselves, at T1, whether we will give up if that time comes. The 
'fallacy', recall, is to view sunk costs as a positive reason to continue the pur-
suit of one's goal. Many of us are susceptible to it. And that can be a reason 
against starting the process.28 
                                                        
26 [omitted].  
27 Rodin (2015). 
28 This involves taking a stance in the debate between actualists and possibilists (see e.g. 
Jackson and Pargetter (1986)).  
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So, the Discount View seems to capture the intuitive data of the Prospective 
and the Quota Views, without the shortcomings of either. It is grounded in 
a plausible picture of our underlying moral reasons. And it is well-moti-
vated: the intrinsic value of well-being does not diminish as you rack up 
moral costs in its service; but the weight assigned to status-based reasons 
plausibly does. There are, however, several objections to address. 
Any intermediate position is likely to take fire from both sides. The first 
pair of objections are likely to be raised by Prospectivists; the second pair 
by those who favour the Quota View.  
The first objection involves questioning the intuitive foundations of the 
Discount View. McMahan argues that we would feel intuitively compelled 
to stop at some point, in cases like Infinite Loop, simply because in any real-
istic scenario, our continuing bad luck would give us more reason to doubt 
that the next attempt will succeed.29 We also know in advance that in risky 
activities we will systematically miscalculate the probabilities—think of 
the 'gambler's fallacy', or the general belief that if you keep plugging away, 
your luck must turn. Caution about our biases, combined with induction 
from past cases, suggests that if we believe our odds of success at Tn are as 
good as they were at T1, we're typically kidding ourselves. In realistic cases 
otherwise similar to Infinite Loop, this explains the intuition that we should 
                                                        
29 McMahan (2015). 
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stop.  
I am sceptical about attempts to explain away intuitions about one case 
by saying that we are simply mistaking it for another, different case. Infinite 
Loop stipulates that the chances are objective, and known. I see no problem 
holding this possibility in one's imagination. I can figure out my considered 
judgement on this case as readily as I can on the other hypothetical cases 
used to construct theories of the morality of self-defence and war. The ob-
jection insists that my intuitions about this case are the moral equivalent of 
a stubborn optical illusion. I don't buy it. What's more, the Discount View 
doesn't rest only on my considered judgement about Infinite Loop. It also 
draws support from the arguments of Section 4. I have a robust intuition 
that those who have already benefited from some sacrifices have a weaker 
claim to aid than those who have not, and this is enough to get the Discount 
View off the ground.  
A second objection in this vein doesn't reach much beyond table-
thumping, but is worth mentioning. Might one complain that it is absurd 
to suppose that, if I arrived on the scene of Iterated Loop, to find you stand-
ing there, haggard and conflicted, unable to decide whether to pull the 
lever, I should first ask you how many times you have pulled it? Isn't it nat-
ural to view this as being, from my perspective, no different than if I were 
to come across the loop track just as the trolley starts to move for the first 
time?  
I doubt that I will convince the incredulous. But there is nothing 
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unusual about my proposal. Our present claims are often affected by the 
past—most obviously, when one has done something to make one respon-
sible for the present situation. Entitlements grounded in historical acquisi-
tion, or in antecedent promises or contracts, might have a bearing on what 
one may do now. Only rarely can we take a decision problem at face value, 
without enquiring into its history. My proposal is in the same spirit as these 
familiar staples of deontological ethics.  
 
So much for the Prospectivists' critique. From the other side, one might ar-
gue that the Discount View implies that the disvalue of causing a death 
changes, depending on whether it is ahead of or behind us.30 One interest-
ing feature of the Discount View, however, is that it is not committed to this 
idea. It says that your reasons to save the five in Infinite Loop are affected by 
the costs that you have already inflicted. That is consistent with insisting 
that the reasons against killing the one are invariant from one iteration to 
the next. Indeed, the Discount View allows us to capture the intuitively at-
tractive thought—violated by the Prospective View—that we owe it to the 
victims of our failed attempts to save the five, to take their deaths into ac-
count at subsequent decision-points.  
Some critics might reject the Discount View because they still don't buy 
its interpretation of trolley cases: despite my arguments to the contrary, 
                                                        
30 Thanks to a referee for this objection. 
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they might insist that we don't have status-based reasons to save the five, 
only well-being-based reasons. I think this objection can take three differ-
ent forms.  
First, perhaps our reasons to save the five in Iterated Loop are wholly 
grounded in the intrinsic value of the well-being realised by saving their 
lives. Deontologists are unlikely to endorse this position. But if they do, 
then they should be Prospectivists in this case. I don't see why the intrinsic 
value of the beneficiaries' well-being should be affected by the moral costs 
incurred in failed attempts to save the five.  
Second, perhaps we don't have any reason to promote intrinsically val-
uable well-being, and the only reasons at stake are respect-based. On that 
account, the Discount View still goes through—as I noted above, our sta-
tus-based reasons (which on this view would be all of the relevant reasons) 
most likely diminish to an asymptote, rather than being wholly exhausti-
ble. 
Third, perhaps we only have well-being-based reasons to save the five, 
but those reasons are grounded both in the intrinsic value of the benefi-
ciaries' well-being, and in their moral status.31 If that's right, then my argu-
ments above can be interpreted as focusing on the elements of our well-being-
based reasons that have to do with status on the one hand, and the intrinsic 
value of well-being on the other.  The underlying ideas do not depend on 
                                                        
31 Chappell (2015).  
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my particular method of book-keeping. They depend only on the idea that 
part of the reason to save the five has to do with the intrinsic value of well-
being, which cannot diminish in weight because of sunk costs, and part has 
to do with facts about status and respect, which can diminish in weight be-
cause of sunk costs.  
 
The last two worries are less objections, than invitations to develop the de-
tails of the Discount View. As such, they must largely remain invitations: in 
the space remaining I cannot answer them satisfactorily.  
The first asks how we determine precisely which costs count against our 
proportionality budget, and how they do so. Suppose, for example, that the 
first attempts to save the beneficiaries were incompetent, with very little 
prospect of success. Or suppose that they were intentionally abortive, with 
the malicious aim of using up the proportionality budget. Or, finally, sup-
pose that the costs inflicted were extremely unlikely to occur—even wholly 
unpredictable—when you acted. How should we deal with each of these 
cases? 
This objection raises tricky questions that any theory of proportionality 
must address. When considering the proportionality of a campaign to 
achieve some objective, we must ask which costs and benefits count to-
wards that judgement. This is true even on a wholly synchronic version of 
proportionality—for example, when thinking about the proportionality of 
a military campaign, how should we factor in the innocent lives that will 
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predictably be taken by incompetent or malevolent subordinates? How 
should we distinguish between costs inflicted by our side, and those in-
flicted by the other side? How do we account for totally unexpected costs 
(the 'unknown unknowns')? I cannot hope to answer these questions here, 
but I can gesture at some responses.   
Most probably, costs inflicted by the incompetent or the malevolent 
should count less against the status-based reasons to aid the beneficiaries 
of your action than would costs inflicted in the sincere and competent at-
tempt to save them. In effect, those costs should go on the 'moral ledger' of 
the incompetent and malevolent agents, rather than counting against the 
claims of their supposed beneficiaries. And as for unpredictable costs: if a 
given cost inflicted in the sincere and competent attempt to save the bene-
ficiaries antecedently had a very low probability of coming about, then that 
should reduce the degree to which it discounts your status-based reasons 
to help those beneficiaries at a subsequent iteration. In other words, when 
weighing sunk costs against your proportionality budget, they must each 
be weighted for the antecedent probability that that particular outcome 
would arise.  
Consider a variation on Iterated Loop, in which there is a tiny probability 
at T1 that instead of there being one innocent victim on LOOP, there are in 
fact 1,000. You pull the lever, and the trolley goes down LOOP, killing 1,000 
people. I suggest that those deaths have considerably less effect on your 
status-based reasons at T2 than they would have if their probability had 
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been much higher. One plausible approach is simply to multiply the prob-
ability by the seriousness of the outcome; but a non-linear probability-
weighting might be more plausible. Either way, the mere fact that some-
thing wholly unexpected and catastrophic happens need not entail that 
one is prohibited from continuing to try to save the beneficiaries. 
Finally, when do the claims of the beneficiaries start to diminish? Are 
they limited to a particular choice situation or might they be determined 
by a longer time-frame? Suppose one of the prospective victims in Iterated 
Loop has been in the same situation on many different prior occasions, with 
many people's lives being sacrificed in part for his sake. Does this mean his 
claim at T1 is weaker than that of others who haven't been the cause of sig-
nificant costs being imposed on others?32 
Obviously the intuitively correct response is that we should calculate 
the strength of each person's claim based only on the present choice situa-
tion. This raises the interesting question of how to delimit a particular 
choice situation, especially when one is engaged in a complex project like 
a war, which can be cut up into many different overlapping segments.  
This points us towards a broader problem in normative ethics, for 
which everyone needs a solution. When we think about proportionality in 
general, what is the proper unit of analysis? In the ethics of self-defence we 
typically think that we should focus on a particular choice situation, rather 
                                                        
32 Thanks to Christian Barry for helping me develop this objection. 
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than making overarching ethical judgements: the person who is responsi-
ble for this particular unjustified threat is potentially liable to be killed, 
even if on the whole he is a better person than the one whom he will oth-
erwise kill. And one is normally only thought liable to be killed to avert a 
threat for which one is responsible oneself, rather than just to avert any 
comparably serious threat, imposed by anyone else (though this is more 




Though the phenomenon it adverts to arises in many different areas of hu-
man agency, the moral sunk costs debate is in its infancy. Adherents of the 
Prospective View think it should stay there: this is a non-problem, since 
proportionality calculations must be strictly forward-looking. But while 
that move might appeal to a certain kind of causal consequentialist (of 
which there are few around these days), it makes little sense for the rest of 
us. Obviously the past can affect what it is permissible to do now. And there 
is a limit to what we are owed by others, which must take into account the 
sacrifices already made on our behalf.  
This does not mean, however, that we should allow moral sunk costs to 
dominate our reasoning. If you can save the lives of some at a small cost to 
others, then you are always permitted, and sometimes required, to do so. 
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In these cases our well-being-based reasons, and plausibly also our status-
based reasons, always have some weight. All the Discount View insists 
upon is that we cannot indefinitely continue to justify imposing the same 
expected costs on others, for the same probability of realising the same 
goal. At some point we must let those burdens fall where they will. 
The Discount View is at least as credible as the Quota and Prospective 
Views: indeed, more so, since it can cater for all the intuitions that those 
views support, while avoiding the objections to both. What's more, I have 
given the Discount View a rationale in our underlying moral reasons 
(which has been done for neither of the alternative views). Our status-based 
reasons, grounded in the importance of showing equal respect to those of 
equal status, plausibly diminish in force as we rack up failed attempts to 
fulfil them. But we also have reasons grounded in the intrinsic value of the 
well-being of those whom we aim to save. And that intrinsic value is unal-
tered by the moral costs incurred when, as is sometimes inevitable, the 
world is uncooperative, and we can save some only at the cost of imposing 
risks on others.  
Australian National University, Australia 
 
References  
Chappell, R. Y. (2015) 'Value Receptacles', Noûs, 49/2: 322-32. 
Fabre, C. (2015) 'War Exit', Ethics, 125/3: 631-52. 
Feinberg, J. (1978) 'Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life', 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 7/2: 93-123. 
Frowe, H. (2018) 'Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming: Why We’re 
 40 
Required to Turn the Trolley', The Philosophical Quarterly. 
Hurka, T. (2005) 'Proportionality in the Morality of War', Philosophy & 
Public Affairs, 33/1: 34-66. 
Jackson, F. and R. Pargetter (1986) 'Oughts, Options, and Actualism', 
Philosophical Review, 95/2: 233-55. 
Kamm, F. M. (2001) 'Making War (and Its Continuation) Unjust', European 
Journal of Philosophy, 9/3: 328-43. 
Kelly, T. (2004) 'Sunk Costs, Rationality, and Acting for the Sake of the Past', 
Noûs, 38/1: 60-85. 
Lazar, S. (2016) 'Anton's Game: Deontological Decision Theory for an 
Iterated Decision Problem', Utilitas: 1-22. 
McMahan, J. (2015) 'Proportionality and Time', Ethics, 125/3: 696-719. 
McMahan, J. (2018) 'Proportionality and Necessity in Jus in Bello', in The 
Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War, Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (ed.), 
New York: Oxford University Press: 418-39. 
Moellendorf, D. (2015) 'Two Doctrines of Jus Ex Bello', Ethics, 125/3: 653-73. 
Parfit, D. (2011) On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rasmussen, K. (2012) 'Should the Probabilities Count?', Philosophical Studies, 
159/2: 205-18. 
Rodin, D. (2008) 'Two Emerging Issues of Jus Post Bellum: War 
Termination and the Liability of Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression', 
in Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, 
Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleffner (ed.), The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press: 53-76. 
Rodin, D. (2015) 'The War Trap: Dilemmas of Jus Terminatio', Ethics, 125/3: 
674-95. 
Taurek, J. M. (1977) 'Should the Numbers Count?', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 6/4: 293-316. 
Walden, K. (2014) 'The Aid That Leaves Something to Chance', Ethics, 124/2: 
231-41. 
Wasserman, D. (1996) 'Let Them Eat Chances: Probability and Distributive 
Justice', Economics and Philosophy, 12/1: 29-49. 
 
